The first thing for a businesslike understanding of the matter is to understand its limits, and therefore I think it desirable at once to point out and dispel a confusion between morality and law, which sometimes rises to the height of conscious theory, and more often and indeed constantly is making trouble in detail without reaching the point of consciousness. You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore you can see the practical importance of the distinction between morality and law. -Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
The Path of the LawIn "Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation," William Allen describes the two conceptions of the corporation. The first conception is that the corporation is the private property of its shareholders. This view is most strongly defended by Milton Friedman in an article he wrote for New York Times Magazine almost 40 years ago,
The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. The gist of this conception is that if corporations aggressively pursue profits and a return for their shareholders, then prices will decline while innovation improves resulting in a net benefit for society. Anything else is beyond the scope of what a corporation is supposed to be doing.
The other conception of a corporation is that it is not strictly private because it enjoys many benefits bestowed upon it by the government including "its juridical personality, its characteristic limited liability, and its perpetual liability." These grants by the government "can be seen as including the advancement of the general welfare." This conception believes that the corporation owes a duty to parties beyond the shareholders, it believes that the corporation owes a duty of loyalty "to all those interested in or affected by the corporation."
How has this played out in the US? Let's take a look at some case law, followed by some federal statutes, pending state statutes, and tax statutes.
Case LawThe best place to start is with the case that is in every US corporate law casebook,
Dodge v. Ford. Yes, that would be those
Dodge brothers, and that
Ford.
A little history. The Dodge brothers had invested a bunch of money in FoMoCo while they were building their own automobile business. They were using dividends from their Ford stock to finance a substantial portion of their business. From all appearances, Henry Ford didn't appreciate the competition so he decided to "freeze-out" the Dodge bros. by holding on to profits and refusing to distribute dividends. Henry Ford said that he refused to pay out dividends because of expansion plans, but evidence showed that expansion plans would not consume anywhere near the ~$60 million in capital surplus FoMoCo had. So, the Dodge bros. pointed to Henry Ford's testimony, which made the court very uncomfortable:
"My ambition is to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes."
The opinion may have been written in 1919, but treating FoMoCo "henceforth as a semi-eleemosynary institution and not as a business institution" was enough for the judges to rule that FoMoCo had to pay out some dividends because corporate social responsibility did not legally extend to greater community engagement, and could not turn the corporation into a charitable institution.
Another case that makes sense to look at is
Shlensky v. Wrigley. That would be the man behind this
Wrigley, concerning the field that this
Major League Baseball team plays in. The plaintiff, Mr. Shlensky, asserted that Mr. Wrigley as president, director and majority shareholder of the Chicago Cubs was acting to the financial detriment of the Cubs and thereby shareholders in the Cubs by refusing to install lights at Wrigley Field. Lights would allow nighttime baseball games which might have larger crowds at the stadium and larger television audiences for increased ad revenue.
Mr. Wrigley offered two reasons for not installing lights: 1) "Baseball is a 'daytime sport,'" and 2) "the installation of lights and night baseball games will have a deteriorating effect upon the surrounding neighborhood." My professor summed this up as Mr. Wrigley is acting upon a responsibility to be good to his neighbors, and he's acting out of an "enlightened self-interest" in exercising his own vision of what baseball is supposed to be. Different States, and thus different laws, but the judges from Michigan in Dodge v. Ford might rule that Mr. Wrigley is acting to the detriment of his shareholders by engaging in community involvement that doesn't bring a return to his shareholders. But this Illinois court actually goes out of its way to make excuses for Mr. Wrigley's behavior.
They say that the lack of lights might actually be good for the Cubs for several reasons: 1) property value is protected or at least maintained; 2) caters to a higher class of patrons; and 3) attendance doesn't appear to effect earnings. The judge might be a Cubs fan searching for excuses for Wrigley, but the nature of these arguments is important. The excuses are based in net economic benefits to the Cubs organization, not net social benefits to the city and citizens of Chicago.
Both of these cases follow the Friedman conception of a corporation, devoid of the advancement of general societal welfare. It appears that under US case law if you want to do good, your goodness better be bringing a return to your shareholders.
Interplay Between Federal and State StatutesState statutes largely govern the function and duties of corporations. However, with publicly traded companies there are federal statutes which regulate corporate governance and provide a legal frame for the social responsibility that most of the world's largest and most powerful corporations are required to abide by.
Federal Statutes - For Publicly Traded CompaniesThe US has a big 'ole regulatory body with the purpose of rooting out and punishing those individuals and corporations who break its corporate governance rules: the
Securities & Exchange Commission. If you're a public corporation and you don't want to get sued for a bunch of money or possibly go to jail, then it's a good idea to abide by their rulebook: the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (and the
'33 one, too, sort of). This is basically a list of dos and don'ts. The rules that get the most play are rules 10b5 and 14a3 of the '34 Act, and the SEC rules promulgated under Sarbanes-Oxley.
Rule 10b5 prohibits manipulation or deception by directors and executives and other insiders in connection with the purchase or sale of stock by untrue statements of material facts, omissions of material facts, or other fraud or deceit. This also covers insider trading. There are civil and criminal penalties, as well as allowances for private suits.
Rule 14a3 imposes annual reporting requirements on corporations. The idea is that you shouldn't be misleading your shareholders by fraudulent reports.
Sarbanes-Oxley was passed in response to the accounting scandals of 2001. It contains several new reporting requirements. The most important, onerous, and scary provision is 302, which requries the CEO and CFO to certify the company's financial info. Knowingly certifying a false financial report carries heavy criminal penalties.
So, that's what you don't want to do. That stuff would be bad.
But, none of the federal rules are about making corporations good. They are simply about making sure that they report the truth about their position to the public about their health. Simple governance concerns, nothing more. It is just a simple responsibility to shareholders to keep them in the loop about the company they have invested in.
Again, this follows the Friedman conception of the corporation.
State LawUnder our annoying, but endearing, federalist system, each State has its own laws, so we're gonna take a sort of general look at this. Each state's corporation laws govern how a corporation is supposed to act. If the corporation is publicly traded then it must abide by both the SEC requirements, and the laws of the state of incorporation.
Corporations only owe two duties under state common law: a duty of care, and a duty of loyalty. These duties are owed to their shareholders.
The duty of care basically says that directors have to pay attention to their corporation, and they have to become informed about transactions.
The duty of loyalty is the duty of the officers, directors, and controlling shareholders of the corporation to not elevate their own interests above the interests of the corporation's shareholders.
These duties are owed only to shareholders follow Friedman's conception of the corporation. However, there is a new strain of laws working their way through state legislatures that would allow directors to consider more than just the interests of their shareholders. These are popularly called "non-shareholder corporate constituency statutes." The
Corporate Securities Law Blog does a fine job explaining such a statute currently being considered in California:
The bill provides that, in considering the best interests of the corporation, directors may consider, without limitation, the long-term and short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders, as well as the long-term or short-term effects that the corporation's actions may have on: - the prospects for potential growth, development, productivity and profitability of the corporation;
- the economy of the state and the nation;
- the corporation's employees, suppliers, customers and creditors;
- community and societal considerations; and
- the environment.
What does this mean? Well it's pretty innocuous, and it doesn't impose any new duties on directors, but apparently it would allow directors to consider the effects of their decisions on parties beyond just their shareholders. This specific law does not go so far as to say that directors owe a duty of loyalty "to all those interested in or affected by the corporation," but it does provide room for a corporation to act "as a semi-eleemosynary institution and not as [purely] a business institution."
The main problem with this statute, aside form its vagueness, is it seems that it would cut off a whole line of law suits for violations of the duty of loyalty by allowing directors greater latitude in arguing why their questionable transactions where not self-dealing. Despite the good intentions of these statutes, this example might actually allow a corporation to legally act less responsibly than they are now required by framing its actions as beneficial to the constituencies listed in the statute.
Federal Tax StatutesThe tax code is clear that corporations are authorized to engage in a certain amount of annual eleemosynary acts. The exact amount is no more than 10% of a corporation's annual taxable income, which can then be deducted from annual income (
26 USC 170(b)(2)(A)). Anything beyond this could be construed as a violation of duty of care or loyalty to the shareholders by donating more than is rewarded. But, since the corporation is rewarded with lower tax liabilities for donations, it actually makes sense for even a selfish corporation to donate to charity at times.
ConclusionUnder US law, there is certainly a distinction between morality and the law. As long as a corporation is operated for the benefit of its shareholders without violating any of the duties while submitting to required disclosures, it is under no obligation to save the world. Statutes proposed to turn the corporation into a moral institution might actually have the opposite effect in the hands of savvy directors and litigators. There are some rewards for donating to charitable causes, but these are minimal. The Friedman conception of the corporation is strong in America, and we have no requirement that one must be a good man.
What's it like in China? Article 5 freaks me out, but we'll look at it more tomorrow.
Other Posts:
>Part 1